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Internal conflicts entail large asset losses for certain segments of the civilian 
population. Asset losses may compromise the future welfare of households, thus 
leaving a legacy of structural poverty that is difficult to overcome. The purpose 
of this article is to analyze how asset losses occur during internal conflicts as 
well as the process of asset accumulation following the initial shock. We 
concentrate on a particularly vulnerable group of victims of war—the displaced 
population in Colombia. In achieving our objective, we adopt quantitative and 
qualitative approaches by: (i) providing a detailed description of losses 
stemming from forced displacement; (ii) analyzing qualitative evidence so as to 
understand the asset recovery processes for the displaced population; and (iii) 
estimating OLS, Instrumental Variable and quartile regressions in order to 
identify the determinants of asset losses stemming from forced displacement, 
and asset accumulation following the initial shock. The results indicate that 
recuperating asset losses or accumulating new assets is a rare event; only 25 
percent of households are able to recover their original asset base, while asset 
ownership still seems insufficient for overcoming poverty. In addition, 
displaced households do not catch up even after consolidating settlement at 
destination sites. Therefore, unless a positive intervention is implemented, 
displaced households become trapped in a low income trajectory, and are 
unlikely to leap forward to a high return asset level.  
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Internal conflicts may entail large asset losses for certain segments of the civilian 
population. During internal conflicts, the main victims of war are civilians targeted by 
armed groups seeking to consolidate territorial strongholds, expand territorial control, 
and/or seize valuable resources (Azam and Hoefler, 2002). Physical assets are 
destroyed, abandoned or seized illegally by armed groups (Matowu and Stewart, 2001; 
and Brück, 2004); financial markets may be disrupted by war activities, and access for 
particular households may become difficult; and informal risk-sharing mechanism are 
generally undermined. The losses of physical, financial, social and human capital are 
therefore substantial. 
As a result, internal conflicts may leave a legacy of structural poverty that is difficult to 
overcome. The recovering of assets after a shock is seldom likely for households located 
at the lower end of the income distribution, and the negative conditions generated by 
conflict only serve to aggravate this situation. In addition to the loss of physical assets, 
victims of conflicts face the possible death of household members, restrictions with 
respect to financial markets, the destruction of social networks, and often 
insurmountable obstacles to entry into urban labor markets.  
The costs of civil conflict often prevail even after peace is achieved. Conflicts congest 
the law enforcement system, lower the probability of punishment, diffuse criminal 
knowledge and technology, and erode morals, thus promoting the emergence of 
criminal and illegal activities (Gaviria, 2000). When the conflict ends, criminal violence 
sometimes soars as the respective destructive technology [or ‘is now utilized for 
criminal activities’]; Guatemala and El Salvador, for example, experienced soaring 
crime rates after peace agreements were reached (Moser and Winton, 2002). Hence, 
active public action aimed at preventing an increase in criminal violence, restoring 
households to previous asset levels, and stimulating growth are required as a component 
of post-conflict reconstruction.  
The purpose of this article is to analyze how asset losses occur during internal conflicts 
and the process of asset accumulation following conflict-induced shocks. In order to 
achieve this objective, we concentrate on a particularly vulnerable group of victims of 
war—the displaced population in Colombia. Three questions are examined. First, we 
seek to understand the process and magnitude of asset losses caused by internal conflict. 
Second, we explore the extent to which the dynamics of the conflict and the purposive  
targeting by armed units of certain groups within the population determine the 
magnitude of asset losses caused by forced displacement. Third, we investigate the 
process of asset recovery by identifying which households are better able to accumulate 
new assets. In addressing these questions, we rely on the household surveys of 2,322 
displaced Colombian households, as well as qualitative studies conducted for the World 
Bank’s ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ Study.  
The structure of this article is as follows. In the second section, we examine the 
economic literature for the purposes of understanding how asset holdings shape 
economic welfare; explaining how households adopt strategies to accumulate and 
protect assets; and describing how a lack of assets creates poverty traps. The third and 
fourth sections present the qualitative and quantitative data, and the model and results 
respectively. Section five concludes.  
2. Asset accumulation dynamics and poverty traps 
Standard microeconomic models predict that in the presence of decreasing returns on 
assets, poor households eventually catch up with wealthier ones in their respective 
welfare trajectories. Nevertheless, locally increasing returns or exclusionary 
mechanisms—such as imperfect credit markets—may hinder convergence, and multiple 
equilibria may arise, restricting some groups to low income trajectories. Where 
investments are lower due to credit market imperfections, investment indivisibilities or 
behavioral components,
1 some economic agents will prove unable to accumulate 
sufficient asset holdings so as to surpass critical thresholds and thus reach a higher 
economic trajectory (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Durlauf, 1992; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002; 
and Carter and Barret, 2006).  
Structural poverty then is strongly correlated with initial conditions, such as an 
insufficient asset base. When returns on small asset holdings are insufficient, income 
will barely cover subsistence needs, thus leaving a negligible surplus for saving. 
Although credit is an alternative mechanism for accumulating assets and thus crossing 
the critical threshold for moving out of poverty, access to credits is often restricted for 
low income households; this is even more so in developing countries. Sacrificing short-
term consumption in order to build up an asset base is also difficult when a household is 
close to subsistence consumption levels. These constraints may push households into 
                                                 
1 Mookherjee and Ray (2002) argue that households may not step-up savings due to habit persistence, 
myopia, or a limited rationality.  
poverty traps, as initial asset inequalities tend to reproduce and deepen themselves over 
time (Carter and Barret, 2006; Zimmermann and Carter, 2003; Reardon and Vosti, 
1995; and Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). 
Aside from determining the ability of households to generate income, assets are an 
important insurance mechanism for coping with shocks (Little et al, 2006). As a 
precautionary measure, households often accumulate non-productive assets, which may 
easily be liquidated when shocks arise (Fafchamps et al, 1998; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993; and Corbett, 1988). When shocks occur, households rely on non-productive assets 
while simultaneously protecting productive assets. The latter are only sold if conditions 
become extremely harsh, and it becomes absolutely necessary in order to avoid 
compromising long-term consumption and welfare (Corbett, 1988). 
Consequently, households usually adopt several strategies to prevent disposing of 
productive assets during times of crisis. Credit markets often ration out low income 
households, and insurance mechanisms are generally not sufficient to completely reduce 
income risks (Townsend, 1994; Ligon et al, 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; and 
Fafchamps and Gulbert, 2006). As a result, households are often compelled to adopt 
other strategies for protecting assets. A common strategy is to sacrifice short-term 
consumption in order to avoid the distress sale of assets (Carter and Barret, 2006; 
Hoddinott, 2006; Barret et al, 2004; and Zimmermann and Carter, 2003). In fact, 
households tend first to adopt reversible strategies; only as options for mitigating risk 
become exhausted, strategies which may compromise future consumption—such as 
forced migration and the sale of land sales—are adopted (Corbett, 1988). 
Poor households, however, have limited alternatives for protecting assets, which leaves 
them ill equipped to cope with shocks, and thus highly prone to falling into poverty 
traps. In the first place, poor households are near subsistence consumption levels to 
begin with; reducing consumption in order to build up an asset base hardly constitutes 
an alternative (Barret et al, 2004). Additionally, immediate reductions in consumption 
may imply long-term costs such as school interruption, drops in nutritional status and 
reductions in human capital investment, all of which would most likely compromise 
future consumption (Carter and Barret, 2006; Jensen, 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; 
Foster, 1995; Behrman, 1988; and Corbett, 1988). By reducing human capital, depleting 
physical capital, and/or destroying social capital, shocks may push households into 
poverty traps. If shocks lead to irreversible asset losses or persist from one period to the  
next, the negative consequences may become permanent, and income may fall below 
the critical wealth threshold for several periods (Hoddinott, 2006; Dercon, 1998). 
Longitudinal studies and qualitative evidence show that structural poverty is frequently 
related to asset deprivation; conversely, the existence of a solid asset base is a strong 
determinant of upward mobility (Krishna et al, 2006; Adato et al, 2006; Barrett et al, 
2004; Little et al, 2006; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003; 
Sen, 2003; and Carter and May, 1999).  
Socio-demographic characteristics, human and social capital, labor markets, and shocks 
also constitute factors related to structural poverty. By providing support for finding a 
job, capital for productive activities, and assistance to mitigate crises, social capital 
facilitates movement out of poverty (Adato et al, 2006; Barrett et al, 2004; and Little et 
al, 2006). Human capital, paired with access to labor markets, is also an important 
mechanism for moving ahead, particularly where asset holdings are low. Moreover, 
investment in human capital allows people to move from low productivity (and low 
paying) jobs to high productivity ones, thus creating a virtuous cycle (Adato et al, 2006; 
Krishna et al, 2006; Barret and McPeak, 2006; Barret et al, 2004; and Sen, 2003). 
Lastly, the empirical evidence identifies large shocks as determinants of downward 
mobility and structural poverty. The death of wage earners, serious illnesses, famines 
and civil conflict may push households into structural poverty if the victims are not 
provided proper aid (Adato et al, 2006, Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; and Corbett, 1988).  
During periods of internal conflict or civil strife, the illegal appropriation, destruction, 
erosion, and depletion of assets become widespread, generally laying down a legacy of 
structural poverty for a considerable segment of the population,. This in turn may sow 
the seeds of future conflicts. First, armed groups seize assets from the civilian 
population for the purposes of financing the war and weakening support among the 
population for their opponents (Hirshleifer, 2001). Added to this, although conflicts 
may have initially erupted as a consequence of specific grievances, the duration and 
sustainability of the conflict is greatly determined by the capacity of armed groups to 
extract rents and appropriate valuable assets from the civilian population. Consequently, 
the loss of physical capital, especially land, during conflicts can sometimes be 
substantial (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Matowu and Stewart, 2001; and André and 
Platteau 1998). Second, inasmuch as the civilian population is targeted by armed 
groups, household disintegration—caused by the death and forced recruitment of  
household members—becomes widespread,; this leads to [or ‘translates into’] large 
losses in human capital. In addition, since some households are forced to migrate from 
urban to rural areas, returns on their human capital—that is, knowledge related to 
agricultural production—deteriorates significantly. Third, conflicts severely disrupt 
formal and informal risk-sharing mechanisms; access to financial markets decreases, 
informal lending plummets, and links to social networks are weakened. Consequently, 
the victims of internal conflict are more likely to fall into chronic poverty (Justino and 
Verwimp, 2006). 
3. Civil Conflict, Crime and Forced Displacement in Colombia  
This section presents a brief history of civil conflict in Colombia, its relation to crime, 
and a description of the data. Civil conflict in Colombia was triggered towards the end 
of the early-sixties by the emergence of several left wing guerrilla groups—the FARC, 
ELN and ERP. Guerrilla-related violence intensified during the late-seventies and early-
eighties with the appearance of illegal marihuana and coca drug crops. Illicit drug trade 
provided rebel groups with massive resources, and has fueled the conflict ever since. 
These resources also funded the creation of right-wing paramilitary groups with ties to 
drug barons and land owners, and which in most regions, have contested the power of 
guerrilla movements. The emergence of paramilitary groups, coupled with the increased 
resources generated by the illegal drug trade, intensified and prolonged the conflict 
throughout the country (Gaviria, 2000; Thoumi, 2002).  
Additionally, the conflict generated favorable conditions for the emergence of crime. 
Gaviria (2000) shows that the conflict, by congesting the law enforcement system, 
lowering the probability of punishment, diffusing criminal know-how and technology, 
and generally eroding morals, has promoted the emergence of crime and drug-
trafficking in Colombia. The appearance of drug trafficking only served to reinforce this 
trend by further eroding the ability of the Colombian Judicial System to properly 
function, while bringing about the spreading of crime (Montenegro and Posada, 2001). 
Intensification of the conflict has caused an escalating trend of attacks against the 
civilian population and has been the main cause behind forced displacement. 
Aggression directed at civilians has constituted an explicit and rational strategy for 
armed groups, as a means of funding their activities and consolidating and expanding 
their territorial strongholds. Forced displacement, in particular, has become a prevalent 
strategy for weakening the support of opponents among the population, clearing regions  
for the growing and trafficking of illegal crops, and expropriating land and resources 
(Engel and Ibáñez, 2007). At the present time, forced displacement affects more than 
3.5 million people, a number corresponding to about seven percent of Colombia’s 
population. This is a figure that stands out worldwide (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2009).  
In order to assess how asset loss actually transpires during internal conflicts, as well as 
the process by which assets are accumulated following the initial shock, we rely on two 
sources of data. The first one is a household survey of displaced Colombian household, 
conducted in 2004 and 2005. The second one contains qualitative data from the 
community reports generated by the World Bank’s “Moving Out of Poverty” 
Colombian case study. Both data sources are described in the following paragraphs. 
Regarding the first source, the sample of household-level data comprises 2,322 
displaced households located in 48 municipalities
2 across 21 departments. The survey 
elicits information regarding the forced migration process, socioeconomic conditions 
before and after displacement, land tenure status, agricultural production, and access to 
government aid. The migration process is characterized at length through the 
information collected regarding the armed actors who cause displacement, the triggers 
behind displacement, and the reasons for choosing a particular reception municipality. 
Data concerning the socioeconomic conditions before and after displacement were 
gathered with respect to household composition, health status, access to health services, 
school enrollment, access to labor markets, labor income, asset ownership, access to 
formal and informal credits, and the level of participation in formal organizations. Two 
sections with detailed questions about access to land, the characteristics of plots, land 
losses, the likelihood of recovering land upon return, and agrictural production were 
also included.  
To achieve these objectives, we constructed a treatment group sample comprised of 769 
displaced household beneficiaries of income generating programs, and a control group 
comprised of 1,553 displaced household non-beneficiaries of such programs.The control 
group is representative of the displaced population at large, while the treatment group is 
representative of those displaced households which are the beneficiaries of income 
generating programs.  
                                                 
2 Municipalities are the smallest administrative units in Colombia. Departments are similar to states in the 
United States.   
Given the large mobility of the displaced population and their unwillingness or fear to 
have their place of residency divulged, constructing a representative sample of it is 
difficult. In constructing the sample, we could have relied on two data sets of displaced 
persons. The first data set, RUPD, is the official registry of displaced persons and 
contains all displaced households who are beneficiaries of government assistance. To 
register in RUPD, displaced households must actively seek out government institutions 
and legally declare their status, which must then be verified by government authorities. 
Consequently, the registry suffers from significant underegistration, due to 
misinformation, arbitrary decision-making by public officials and biases inherent in the 
registration process (Ibáñez and Velasquez, 2009). Moreover, the RUPD data provides 
little detail concerning the displacement process and household structures. The second 
data set is the RUT System, which covers (i) displaced households requesting assistance 
from any of the 3,764 Catholic parishes scattered throughout the country; and (ii) those 
households included in censuses conducted in certain municipalities by the Catholic 
Church. A detailed questionnaire was applied to a sample of displaced households taken 
from this data set.
3 The resulting data contained information concerning 32,093 
households and nearly 150,000 people. Although the RUT system is not representative 
of the displaced population as a whole, the detailed questionnaire provides ample 
information useful for constructing a stratified sample. Consequently, the design for the 
control sample was based on the RUT sample.  
The control sample was divided into two sub-samples to correct for RUT bias: (i) 794 
RUT households; and (ii) 759 non-RUT households. A stratified sample was selected 
from the RUT sample; enumerators then proceeded to locate the RUT households and 
administer the survey. Even though the RUT sample covers all of the municipalities that 
have received displaced persons, only certain households are included in this data base, 
thus allowing for a sample bias. To correct for this bias, for each RUT household 
surveyed, we tracked and surveyed a non-RUT displaced household in the same 
neighborhood. Given that the RUT provides rich information  for constructing a 
stratified sample, and covers a wide geographical area, we found that this strategy is 
appropriate for reducing the RUT bias. In fact, a recent survey representative of the 
                                                 
3 The survey elicits information aimed at identifying the causes of and actors responsible for 
displacement, household characteristics, land tenure status, access to labor markets and the level of 
education before and after displacement, as well as the different needs of displaced persons/households. 
The questionnaire also seeks to gain information regarding participation in organizations and the 
willingness of displaced households to return to respective points of origin.  
displaced population shows that the observable socio-economic characteristics are 
indeed similar to those highlighted in our sample (Garay, 2008).  
The beneficiaries of income generating programs were surveyed in the same 
municipalities selected from the RUT and non-RUT samples. Households were 
randomly selected from a beneficiary list provided by three organizations responsible 
for implementing these programs. Such programs seek to boost the productive activities 
of displaced households by offering labor training, courses for small enterprises’ 
management, and seed capital for initiating productive activities. Information about the 
programs is disseminated through massive information campaigns. The potential 
beneficiaries, identified during an initial stage, must prove that they are displaced 
persons and have been recipients of Emergency Humanitarian Aid (EHA).
4 Households 
with high dependency ratios, female-headed households and households with younger 
heads have priority over other households. Once the potential beneficiaries are selected, 
program operators visit their homes to verify the declared conditions, as well as to 
design a preliminary support plan. 
After the visits, the pool is further narrowed, and a relatively small group of potential 
beneficiaries is selected. This group must attend training programs where they learn 
how to design labor or small enterprise plans; these are then submitted to a committee, 
which in turn selects the actual group of beneficiaries. Benefits include labor training, 
small enterprise courses, or a combination of both, as well as psychological support. By 
the end of the program, labor and enterprise plans should be fully designed. Those 
beneficiaries who have submitted the former are hired by private firms for short-term 
practice. During this period, their wages are funded by the implementing organizations; 
the practice concludes three months later, after which, the private firms can decide 
whether they wish to hire the beneficiaries. Detailed small enterprise plans should 
include a feasibility analysis, an investment schedule, and a business plan. The 
beneficiaries of small enterprise training receive a maximum sum of US$500 as seed 
capital with which to initiate the economic activity designed during the program.  
In addition, we used qualitative data from the community reports of the World Bank’s 
‘Moving Out of Poverty’ study. The purpose of the study was to understand the factors 
                                                 
4 Emergency Humanitarian Aid is provided to those displaced households that are registered in the State 
Official Registry System. This assistance is provided during the first three months of displacement, and 
covers food aid, cash to cover transportation needs, and housing costs for up to three months.  
  
that help or hinder movements out of poverty. Eight case studies were undertaken at 
return and destination sites for displaced households in Colombia. The community 
reports allow us to understand the impact of forced displacement, how forced migration 
imposes asset losses upon displaced households, and the process by which some 
households are able to recover assets and steadily improve their living conditions at 
destination sites. By mixing qualitative and quantitative evidence, we are able to 
identify which households are better able to recover from displacement shock, as well as 
the dynamics behind this recovery.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to understand how a severe shock, namely internal 
conflict and forced displacement, causes asset loss, and how households are able to 
recover from this shock. We adopt both quantitative and qualitative approaches in order 
to achieve our objective, inclusive of: (i) a detailed description of the losses stemming 
from forced displacement; (ii) qualitative evidence which enables us to understand the 
complex process by which a displaced population recovers it assets; and (iii) OLS, 
Instrumental Variable and quartile regressions so as to identify the determinants of asset 
losses as a consequence of displacement, as well as asset accumulation after 
displacement.  
4.1. Qualitative analysis 
This section describes the impact of forced displacement on its victims based on 
qualitative data from the eight case studies of the World Bank’s ‘Moving Out of 
Poverty’ Colombian case study. We assess the impact of forced displacement on 
household welfare, examine the process of asset loss, and identify the three different 
groups of displaced households that emerge after the process of migration and asset 
loss.  
4.2.1.  Welfare impacts of forced displacement and the process of asset losses 
 
Civil conflicts impose economic costs even before displacement takes place. In the 
Colombian case, civil conflict and the presence of armed groups has halted economic 
production, undervalued assets, and hampered government support. Guerrillas and 
paramilitaries have increasingly exerted control over the civilian population, its social 
relations, and productive activities. As a result, towns in conflict zones face fewer 
economic opportunities, a sudden stop in agricultural production, a drop in daily  
agricultural wages, and pervasive unemployment. The presence of illegal armed groups 
also undermines governmental support and erodes social capital in some communities. 
Access to labor training, technical assistance programs, credits, and support for 
productive projects has thus basically disappeared. The prospect of renewed violence 
and the fact that communities become stigmatized as belonging to “conflict zones” 
increases uncertainty, decreases land value, and leads households to cut back on 
investment.  
Forced displacement, on the other hand, produces substantial losses of physical assets, 
which translates into vulnerability to poverty. Displaced households lose or abandon 
their life’s work, crops, animals, lands, land improvements, investments and houses. As 
a result, such households experience a harsh and sudden decline in living conditions and 
productive capacity. Moreover, losing land and other physical assets not only hinders a 
household’s capacity to earn income, it also eliminates the possibility of production for 
self-consumption. A lack of land access entails fewer economic opportunities, impedes 
the ability of households to cope properly with the shock of displacement, and is 
generally identified by households as the predominant factor underlying their descent 
into poverty.  
Some households—mainly those which migrated as a preventive measure—were able to 
sell their assets prior to migrating. Such sales allowed them to mitigate the displacement 
shock during the first months of settlement, and to enjoy better economic conditions at 
destination sites. Frequently, however, such sales took place at prices well below market 
levels. Such distress sales barely covered consumption needs for a few months, and 
conditions generally worsened significantly once savings were exhausted; thus, while 
they postponed the erosion of asset bases, they did not prevent it.  
Participation in urban labor markets was slow due to the depreciation of human capital, 
discrimination against displaced persons, and the fragile psychological conditions 
resulting from being victims of violence. Given that displaced households mostly 
arrived from rural areas and that their working experience was limited to agricultural 
activities, the returns from “agricultural human capital” generally decreased in urban 
areas. Conflict and forced migration may also have caused psychological disorders, 
which often produce a sense of helplessness, defeat and irrational fear. People facing 
such disorders were usually scared to venture out of their homes and search for jobs. 
Lastly, conflict and forced displacement may have produced household fragmentation  
as well as resulted in the death or abandonment of household members, individuals 
often of a productive age. Women often became the heads of households by default, 
something which further increased households’ vulnerability. All these elements 
constituted obstacles to finding jobs and generating income.  
A lack of physical assets, suitable employment opportunities, and risk-sharing 
mechanisms implied substantial welfare losses for households, which consequently 
became unable to cope with future shocks. The loss of relatives, connections and social 
networks presumably led to fewer opportunities to work, study, and participate in 
community savings programs. Although some households participated in social 
networks at destination sites, informal risk-sharing mechanisms nonetheless did not 
fully insure against risk, as participants’ income levels were fairly low and 
homogenous. The disruption of social networks also generated obstacles for acquiring 
formal and informal credit. Generally speaking, displaced households were rationed out 
of formal financial markets, and were thus obliged to apply for usurious credits, credits 
for which guarantees and references were not required; as a consequence, profits were 
sucked up by the large cost of the credit. Accumulating assets became virtually 
impossible because income was barely sufficient to cover subsistence needs and pay off 
credits. 
4.2.2. Three groups of displaced households  
 
The qualitative evidence allows us to distinguish between three groups of displaced 
households based on the different paths they followed toward asset recovery—
households which are chronically poor both before and after displacement; households 
which could possibly become chronically poor; and households capable of initiating a 
recovery process, but for which the magnitude of recovery is unclear.  
The first group—households that were chronically poor both before and after 
displacement—were asset-deprived households at the site of origin, and remained poor 
after displacement due to the difficulty of coping with the conflict-induced shock. These 
households exhibited low levels of human capital, were unable to find appropriate jobs 
that matched their agricultural working experience, were fairly isolated from social 
connections, and had household structures that denoted a high degree of vulnerability to 
poverty.  
The second group is comprised of households falling into poverty following 
displacement. Prior to displacement, these households were better-off and had relatively 
large asset holdings. Because of conflict and displacement, they suffered considerable 
asset losses, and the deterioration in the economic welfare of these households was 
particularly large. Asset losses—inclusive of the loss of physical, social, financial, 
human, and institutional assets—placed them on low-income trajectories, moreover, 
where the possibility of moving onto high-performance trajectories seemed remote. 
Since the returns from different kinds of assets complement one another, and 
households in this group lacked most of them, providing or gaining access to one asset 
generally did not improve their situation. 
The last group is comprised of households capable of achieving successful asset 
recovery dynamics. These households shared some common characteristics—a 
combination of higher levels of education and training, contact with and access to social 
networks at reception sites, savings and micro-credits, and one or more sources of 
income.  
Better educated households and those whose members had suitable working experience 
were able to engage in economic activities and extract higher rents, in contrast to 
households made up of members with no formal education or who were previously 
dedicated to agricultural activities. Labor training programs were critical for households 
recovering their productive capacity and undertaking new activities; this was 
particularly the case for women, who felt empowered after participating in training 
programs.  
Human capital alone, although necessary, was not sufficient for recovering from the 
shock of displacement. Having an additional source of income—whether in the form of 
savings, credits or agricultural production—was crucial to the recovery process. Labor 
training without seed capital or micro-credits proved useless. While labor training did 
boost confidence and provided knowledge relevant to an unknown occupation, to be 
effective, it must be complemented with seed capital. Those households which 
successfully overcame the consequences of displacement were able to allocate savings, 
resources from asset sales, and seed capital to the recovery of productive capacity—in 
the form of access to land plots at destination sites, land improvements, and/or the 
purchasing of livestock—as opposed to the supplying of basic needs. Income generating 
programs thus might constitute a factor promoting recovery, inasmuch as they provide  
resources for recovering productive capabilities. Nonetheless, most beneficiaries of such 
programs considered that the amount of seed capital provided was insufficient for 
starting a profitable business. Projects promoting cooperatives or associative income 
generating schemes appeared to have a higher impact and a greater likelihood of 
succeeding than individual projects, inasmuch as they can be potentially larger, and the 
risk is shared among members. Savings, seed capital and liquid capital, however, were 
not sufficient to guarantee successful asset recovery. Households with insufficient 
assets, low levels of human capital, no social networks, and no labor training faced 
difficulties in starting small businesses, and ended up depleting these resources without 
recovering.  
The importance of social networks and social capital in facilitating the move out of 
poverty is manifold. First, social networks provide resources and assistance during the 
migration process in fulfilling basic needs. Second, social networks at destination 
municipalities may provide households with employment opportunities as well as much 
needed working and business permits, likewise, access to government or NGO 
programs. Although social capital is perceived as an instrument for recovery, 
participation in social networks does not in and of itself guarantee a transition to high 
yield activities. Even households that actively participated in formal organizations often 
remained trapped in low-yield trajectories because access to investment capital was 
restricted and property rights were not well defined. The qualitative evidence from the 
‘Moving Out of Poverty’ study in Colombia provides insights into the virtuous and 
vicious cycles that characterize the process of asset recovery. These cycles are assessed 
in greater detail in the following section. 
4.3. Asset loss and asset accumulation: a simple reduced form model for identifying 
determinants 
The purpose of this section is to provide evidence concerning the impact of internal 
conflict upon asset trajectories, and the ability of households to recover from conflict-
related shocks. We first examine the process of asset loss stemming from forced 
displacement and how the dynamics of conflict determine asset losses. Second, we 
identify the determinants of asset accumulation once those forcefully displaced resettle 
at their destination points.  
The asset dynamics of displaced households are described  by two different factors: the 
value of assets at the municipality of origin that were abandoned following  
displacement ( L A ); and the value of the asset base at the receiving municipality ( R A ). 
Each of these is in turn influenced by other factors. Thus, asset losses are driven by the 
internal conflict’s dynamics in the region of origin, the victimization process 
households endure prior to displacement, and the strategies households adopt in order to 
minimize asset loss. Asset accumulation at the point of destination, on the other hand, is 
determined by the income generation capacity of households, their vulnerability 
conditions, the level of their participation in programs aimed at supporting displaced 
households, and the respective settlement process. 
We discuss first the determinants of asset losses ( L A ). The conflict dynamics that 
trigger forced migration are strongly linked to asset loss. For example, since armed 
groups need to fund their operations, the presence of illegal armed groups  I P  at sites 
of origin frequently results in asset seizure and abandonment. Conversely, the presence 
of government forces  G P  will likely serve to protect households from illegal groups’ 
attacks, and thus reduce the likelihood of their being forced to move and abandon 
assets.  
The victimization profile of a household may determine the extent of asset loss it 
experiences. When household members are forced to flee hastily in order to save their 
lives, or after being the victims of violent events (reactive displacement Re ), the 
possibility of protecting assets becomes greatly minimalized. On the other hand, when 
households migrate preventively out of fear that the conflict will escalate in the region, 
it is easier to plan the migration. In the latter case then, protecting, selling or transferring 
assets to family or friends is more likely; likewise, controlling assets at origin 
municipalities. Direct attacks sometimes imply the death or disappearance of family 
members, usually the main breadwinners, who in the case of rural households are 
frequently male  PP . Since land titles are generally registered to male household heads 
and informal marital unions are widespread in Colombian rural areas (Meertens, 2005), 
households that lose the main breadwinner often find it difficult to recover land. Such 
households may face substantial asset losses. 
Attacks on the civil population are not random. Certain groups are deliberately targeted 
as part of a war strategy. Thus, for instance, community leaders or households with 
strong social networks  O CS  are more likely to be targeted by armed groups.  
Notwithstanding, social networks can be effective mechanisms for some households to 
control assets and exploit land plots following displacement. Consequently, the impact 
of social capital on asset loss is uncertain. Land owners and tenants  L  are also 
attractive targets for armed groups as, once having fled, their abandoned lands can be 
seized by armed groups. The incentive to attack land owners increases as the larger the 
land plot; on the other hand, large landowners are better able to adopt strategies for 
protecting their assets. The age structure of a household   S  may also prompt attacks by 
armed groups—young men constitute potential combatants, and thus are desirable as 
recruits Direct attacks undermine a household’s ability to protect its assets; thus, 
households with high levels of social capital, access to land, or with young males, may 
face large asset losses. An interesting factor concerns the ethnic make-up of the 
household. Thus, the fact of belonging to an ethnic minority   Me , such as an 
indigenous or Afro-Colombian group, may also determine the extent of asset loss. The 
effect, however, is difficult to establish a priori. Ethnic minorities suffer direct attacks 
from armed groups with greater frequency; hence, these households face greater 
obstacles when trying to control assets at origin sites following displacement. On the 
other hand, ethnic minorities often possess collective land titles, which may help protect 
them against illegal land seizures by armed groups.  
Households are not necessarily passive victims of armed conflict, and some households 
adopt strategies aimed at minimizing the extent of asset loss. The migration strategy of 
relocating within the municipality is sometimes employed, for example, as a means of 
protecting and/or recovering assets. Households may decide to migrate within the 
municipality (M) in order to maintain control over their productive assets, continue with 
productive activities on their land plots, and/or extract rents. Other factors may also play 
a role; households facing tight budget constraints, for instance, may not be able to 
migrate outside of the municipality. Since households may decide to migrate within the 
municipality in order to protect assets, intramunicipal displacement must be considered 
an endogenous variable. We use instrumental variable estimations to correct for 
endogeneity. Besides protecting assets, households may decide to migrate within the 
municipality if friends and families residing at the destination site are able or willing to 
provide support. Notwithstanding, contacts at destination sites—such as family and 
friends—does not determine the extent of asset losses. Contacts at destination sites are 
therefore are used as the exclusion variables. In order to protect land plots following  
displacement, households may decide to register their title in official records (F). 
Having legal title over land plots may hinder illegal seizure, thus discouraging attacks 
by armed groups, or helping households protect land once forced displacement has 
occurred. Notwithstanding, having legal title may prove ineffective in regions where the 
rule of law and the protection of property rights is lacking, which is usually the case in 
regions experiencing conflict. In addition, formal land titles may boost the value of 
land, implying higher asset losses. Human capital,   H , constitutes an element allowing 
households to device strategies for protect assets prior to migration. Better educated 
individuals may design effective strategies for protecting assets at origin sites, selling 
them prior to migration, and/or controlling them at destination sites. On the other hand, 
better educated individuals may constitute effective community leaders, and thus be 
seen as posing a threat to armed groups seeking to dissolve any civil resistance. 
Additionally, the uncertainty of loosing assets such as land may push certain households 
to invest more in transferable capital, like education, instead of location-specific assets; 
for these households then, the loss of physical assets might be lower. Thus, the impact 
of human capital on asset loss is uncertain. 
The determinants of asset loss are defined then by the following reduced form: 
  F M S L CS PP R P P A A o e G I L L , , , , , , , ,  . 
Asset accumulation at destination sites is driven by factors other than those that 
determine asset loss. First, the length of settlement in destination sites,  T , may exert a 
positive or negative influence on asset accumulation. As households become settled for 
longer periods of time at destination sites, knowledge about the labor market increases 
and economic opportunities broaden, thus increasing the likelihood of accumulating 
new assets. As the duration of settlement at the new location increases, however, 
respective governmental aid programs eventually come to an end, and the short-term 
benefits of income-generating programs vanish. If the first effect exceeds the second 
effect—that is, if a household’s ability to recover productive capacity offsets the 
discontinuation of resources from aid programs—the period of settlement will have 
exerted a positive effect on asset dynamics. Conversely, if the second effect is stronger 
than the first one, then the period of settlement will have affected asset dynamics 
negatively.   
Human capital,  H , may make adaptation to the conditions at the destination site 
easier, thus improving asset accumulation following displacement. Higher levels of 
human capital may be fundamental to competing in urban labor markets and finding 
alternative sources of income, and thus accumulating new assets. However, human 
capital is not necessarily a transferable asset. Agricultural experience   Ag  is not useful 
in urban labor markets, for example, inasmuch as there, the predominant occupations 
for low-skilled workers are in construction, services and/or petty trade. in such cases, 
the resultant depreciation of human capital restricts earning possibilities and, 
consequently, asset accumulation. 
The ability to generate income is crucial for promoting asset accumulation. Income 
earned in labor markets or through small enterprises,   R Y , besides covering subsistence 
needs, may be invested in new productive assets. Some displaced households are still 
able to control assets in their hometowns and extract rents from production on their land 
plots. Using rents obtained by exploiting these plots, they are able to accumulate new 
assets at receiving municipalities. Social networks and social capital at destination 
municipalities,   R CS , among other things, help households mitigate shocks, acquire 
information about aid programs or job opportunities, and gain access to special 
assistance programs and credits.  
A household’s structure and its socioeconomic characteristics are also determinants of 
displaced its asset dynamics. Among other factors, income generation and the 
accumulation of assets depend on a household’s structure and the age of the household 
head. High dependency ratios,   D , imply fewer members who are generating income 
and members who have greater needs, thus restricting the household’s capacity for 
recovering assets. Female household heads,  J , may face more obstacles than men to 
accumulating new assets, due to their vulnerability following displacement. Age,  E , 
may exhibit an inverted u-shape relationship with respect to asset dynamics. Because 
young displaced persons have less work experience, their incomes tend to be low; this 
further makes asset recovery difficult. On the other hand, older persons may have 
difficulties learning new occupations and adapting to changing circumstances. Asset 
accumulation, consequently, increases with age, but only with diminishing marginal 
returns. Lastly, belonging to an ethnic minority may have a negative impact on asset  
accumulation, as these groups face particular vulnerabilities, given their cultural 
heritage, language barriers, and so forth. 
Access to programs targeting displaced households, such as income generation 
programs  i G , may provide an initial stimulus for recovering productive capacity. 
Establishing the causal link between access to income generation programs and asset 
accumulation, however, is difficult. First, as explained before, access to these programs 
is conditional on having first received humanitarian aid, such as provides basic needs 
during the first three months following displacement. Although humanitarian aid does 
not contribute to asset accumulation, beneficiary households may receive other kinds of 
support, such that it may promote asset accumulation. Whether this is the case or not is 
impossible to identify from our data. Thus, the coefficient for income generation 
programs may be capturing the impact of other programs as well. Second, since in 
addition to other factors income-generating programs are not randomly assigned—with 
households being selected according to the magnitude of their vulnerability and 
economic conditions—being the beneficiary of such programs constitutes an 
endogenous variable. To correct for this endogeneity, we employ an instrumental 
variables approach, based on whether a household was a beneficiary of humanitarian 
aid. As described before, only those households that had previously received 
humanitarian aid were potential beneficiaries of income-generating programs; thus, we 
anticipate that this variable will be a strong predictor of program participation. 
However, asset accumulation is not determined by a short-term program which is 
designed primarily to cover basic needs. The accumulation for asset holdings for 
household i then is defined as: 
 G Me E PP J D CS Y Ag H T A A R R R R , , , , , , , , , ,  . 
The reduced form equations for asset loss stemming from displacement and asset 
accumulation at destination sites are estimated using the ENHD described in the 
previous sections.  
4.5. Quantitative analysis: the determinants of asset loss and asset accumulation 
In order to identify the determinants of asset loss and asset accumulation for displaced 
households using the models specified in section 3.4., we first estimate a group of 
regressions. Before discussing the determinants of asset dynamics, we discuss here    
some descriptive statistics, and analyze the magnitude of asset loss stemming from 
forced displacement. The figures for asset loss are only estimated for the control group.  
The displacement process together with household characteristics are presented in Table 
1. First, the level of violence in the regions of origin is extremely large. More than 
86 percent of households displaced reactively
5, that is after being victimized in an attack 
by illegal armed groups. Moreover, while displaced households readily perceive the 
presence of illegal armed groups (89.6% of the time) it is less often the case that they 
perceive the presence of government forces (50.3% of the time), such as provide 
protection. Second, while some households do prefer to migrate within the general 
vicinity of their hometown (15.2%), most actually end up migrating out of their 
municipality, directly to their final destination municipality. Third, displaced 
households are a particular vulnerable group relative to other groups within the 
Colombian population. Compared to urban poor households, for instance, displaced 
households are larger, have a higher frequency of female heads, have greater 
dependency ratios, and more often are made up of ethnic minorities.  
The length of settlement at destination sites merits a separate discussion. The 
distribution for length of settlement is spread, with the average length of settlement 
being 1.345 days, and with a standard deviation of 1.040 days. Such a large time 
horizon may cause an attrition bias as the sample may only identify those displaced 
households that remain trapped in poverty, whereas successful households may have 
moved to other neighbors and lost their connection with the church. However, the 
length of settlement for most households is less than five years: the median is 1200 days 
(3.28 years) and the 75
th quartile is 1.759 (4.8 years).
6  
Table 1. The displacement process and household characteristics 
  Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Reactive displacement  86.2% 
Perception of the presence of illegal armed groups at origin 
site 
89.6% 
Perception of the presence of government forces at origin site  50.3% 
Intramunicipal displacement  15.2% 
Intradepartmental displacement  57.6% 
Migration directly to destination  88.9% 
Time of settlement at destination site – days  1.345 
(1.040) 
                                                 
5 A household displaces reactively when it is the victim of a direct treat, following the homicide, forced 
recruitment or abduction of a household member, or the massacre of some or one household member.  
6 We thank Ernesto Schargrodsky for raising this point.   
Ethnic minority  24.2% 
Male head of household  62.7% 
Household size  5.16 
(2.14) 
Number of persons between 12 and 17 years of age   0.84 
(0.99) 
Number of persons between 18 and 65 years of age  2.48 
(1.36) 
Dependency ratio  0.34 
(0.34) 
Years of age of household head  42.6 
(13.3) 
Number of persons between 12 and 17 years of age   0.84 
(0.99) 
Number of persons between 18 and 65 of age  2.48 
(1.36) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
 
The loss and recovery of housing, physical capital and land are presented in Table 2. 
Nearly half of the sample reports losing their home as a consequence of displacement, 
with only a few households able to acquire new housing at destination sites. However, 
close to 18 percent of households’ homes were not legally owned prior to displacement, 
whereas following displacement, there was a greater tendency to own houses—i.e., at 
destination sites. The average monetary housing loss per household is US$ 3,333.
7  
Productive assets, other than those related to land and plot improvement, comprise the 
greater bulk of asset loss and are difficult to recover following displacement. In fact, 
productive asset depletion worsens over time following settlement at destination sites. 
On the other hand, households are able to recover expensive articles with much greater 
ease less, such as electronic appliances and mobile goods (such as vehicles).  
Land seizure or abandonment is also considerable. Given the predominant proportion of 
the displaced population which has a rural origin, it is not surprising that nearly 55 
percent of diplaced households had formal or informal access to land; the average size 
of land plots is 13.2 hectares, which is not negligible. Given the weak property rights 
that prevail in Colombian rural areas, recovering land once the conflict ends is a 
complex process—over 30 percent of displaced households legally owned land, while 
the remainder had only informal access to it. Moreover, only 12.8 percent still 
controlled their land plots following displacement, either directly or with the support of 
family and friends. Consequently, only 25 percent of households are deemed likely to 
recover land upon their return. If recovering land is difficult, recovering the capital 
                                                 
7 We used the exchange rate for 09/02/2007, which stood at US$ 1 = COP$ 2,160.   
invested to improve land plots or increase agricultural productivity is even more so. 
Close to one fifth of land plots had irrigation, the average number of livestock was 29, 
and the net present value of foregone agricultural revenue over a life-time is US$ 
15,787 per household.
8 
When physical assets and land are accounted for, the average loss per household is 
nearly US$ 7,037. The capacity of displaced households to recover from this kind of 
asset loss is limited. If we measure the recovery of assets as the value of assets at the 
destination site minus the value of assets at the site of origin, on average, households 
report a net loss of approximately US$ 3,796 per household.  
Table 2. Asset loss and asset recovery: housing, physical capital and land 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Error 
Housing    
Percentage of households that lost housing at the origin site  46.50%  - 
Percentage of households that lost housing at the origin site 
and recovered it at the reception site 
6.40% - 
Percentage of households that did not own housing at the 
origin site and own housing at the destination site 
17.90% - 
Average loss in housing  US $ 3,333  US $ 278 
Physical assets    
Productive assets (excluding land) at the origin site  US $ 370  US $ 42 
Other assets at the origin site  US $ 93  US $ 5 
Percentage of productive assets at the origin site  55.20%  0.02% 
Productive assets (excluding land) at the destination site  US $ 19  US $ 5 
Other assets at the destination site  US $ 93  US $ 5 
Percentage of productive assets at the destination site  12.80%  0.03% 
Land    
Land tenure  55.40%  - 
Total hectares of land owned  13.2  2.1 
Value of total hectares owned  US $ 3,981  US $ 417 
Percentage of hectares with formal property titles  31.20%  - 
Average number of hectares lost   4  0.8 
Value of hectares lost  US $ 972  US $ 185 
Percentage of hectares than can be recovered after return  25.80%  - 
Percentage of hectares under family control  12.80%  - 
Percentage of land with irrigation  19.00%  - 
Number of animals  29.9  2.6 
Net present value of agricultural profit loss  US $ 15,787 US $ 2,500 
Total assets and asset recovery    
Value of assets at origin site (excluding land)  US $ 7,037  US $ 278 
Value of assets at destination site (excluding land)  US $ 3,194  US $ 231 
Net loss of assets  US $ - 3,796 US $ 32 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
                                                 
8 To calculate the net present value of foregone agricultural revenues, we assume that agricultural 
production ends when the household head dies; we thus use a discount rate of 9.5%. According to the 
WHO, the life expectancy of women and men in Colombian rural areas is 76.3 and 67.5 years, 
respectively.   
 
Displacement shock, aside from significantly decreasing victims’ asset holdings, 
condenses the asset distribution around a lower mean and median. Graph 1 depicts the 
distribution of asset values before and after displacement. Prior to displacement, the 
mean and median of asset values are larger and the distribution more spread out; asset 
values at the upper tail of the distribution are more frequent. Following displacement, 
the distribution condenses significantly, with most households concentrated near zero, 
and with just a few households having a larger value of assets. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
Asset recovery is difficult for most displaced households. Graph 2 depicts a quadratic fit 
between the net change in asset value and the length of settlement for the three groups 
identified in the qualitative analysis. Group 1 corresponds to the first quartile of the net 
change in asset value, Group 2 to the second and third quartile, and Group 3 to the 
fourth quartile. The majority of displaced households, close to 75 percent of them, 
reported a negative net change in asset value, while only 25 percent of displaced 
households were able to recover assets following displacement. Consequently, the 
median of asset recovery is zero, which indicates a worrisome trend. As identified by 
the qualitative evidence, Group 1 faced large asset losses, which only deepened as time 
passed; the recuperation of assets was slow for Group 2, such that after five years of 
displacement, asset loss was still higher than asset accumulation; and while Group 3 
was able to recover from the displacement shock, the stock of assets at destination sites 
remained constant.   
Graph 2. Net change in asset value for the three groups
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
a. Asset recovery is measured as the value of assets at destination sites minus asset losses caused by 
displacement. 
Although in theory  households might resort to labor income, credits, and risk-sharing 
mechanisms in order to recover assets, access to these mechanisms is not widespread 
among the displaced population. The figures for financial capital, access to labor 
markets, human capital and social capital before and after displacement are presented in 
Table 3. First, the potential access to informal credits drops sharply following 
displacement (from 17.9% to 9.3%). Access to formal credit markets at destination sites 
does increase five fold relative to access at origin sites, though this is largely because 
with respect to the latter, access is negligible; thus, at destination sites, only 6.6 percent 
of households are the beneficiaries of formal credits. Furthermore, credit conditions 
gradually worsen over time at destination sites—the amounts approved are half those 
approved at origin sites, and the number of monthly installments eventually declines.  
Drops in asset holding returns are not fully compensated by labor income. 
Unemployment rates for all household members soar following displacement, and the 
pace at which labor conditions improve is extremely slow—initially, the unemployment 
rate for household heads during the first three months of settlement at destination sites 
is 53 percent; after a year, it is 16 percent. Since displaced households face poor labor 
conditions and are mostly absorbed by informal labor markets, the labor income per 
equivalent adult corresponds to less than half of labor income prior to displacement.  
The depreciation of human capital and low education levels are important obstacles that 
displaced households need to overcome when competing in urban markets. Tight labor  
markets at destination sites may partially hinder the rapid absorption of displaced 
households. Hence, even after a year of settlement, the unemployment rate for displaced 
household heads is still greater than that for the urban extreme poor. Low formal human 
capital (5.7 years) and inadequate previous labor experience with respect to urban jobs 
(57.3% of displaced persons were dedicated to agriculture prior to displacement) may 
be the main causes driving high unemployment rates.  
Informal risk-sharing mechanisms are also severely disrupted. Informal credits, as 
discussed above, drop significantly. Some families disintegrate on account of the main 
breadwinner dying or abandoning the household (8.5%). While households that 
participated in organizations prior to displacement often rapidly become engaged at 
destination sites, the new organizations are usually dramatically different from those to 
which they previously belonged. Prior to displacement, displaced households were 
generally members of organizations dedicated to fostering productive activities (e.g., 
peasant organizations and cooperatives) through the provision of credits, technical 
assistance and mediation with formal institutions. At destination sites, households are 
mostly members of organizations dedicated to charity work—that is, organizations 
aimed at providing subsistence support rather than promoting productive activities. 
Table 3. Financial capital, labor markets, human capital and social capital 
   Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Financial capital – informal credits    
Potential access to informal credits at the origin site  17.90%  - 
Access to informal credits at the origin site  8.30%  - 
Potential access to informal credits at the destination site  9.30%  - 
Access to informal credits at the destination site  6.40%  - 
Financial capital – formal credits    
Access to formal credits at the origin site  1.40%  - 
Credit amount at the origin site  US$ 1,481  US $ 1,019 
Number of monthly installments at the origin site  14.5  1 
Access to formal credits at the destination site  6.60%  - 
Amount of credit at the destination site  US $ 741  US $ 185 
Number of monthly installments at the destination site  10.4  1.4 
Labor markets    
Unemployment level for household heads at the origin site  1.70%  - 
Labor income per equivalent adult at the origin site  US $ 893  US $ 151 
Unemployment level for household heads at the destination 
site 
16.10% - 
Labor income per equivalent adult at the destination site  US $ 289  US $ 17 
Human Capital    
Years of education of household head  5.7  0.1 
Dedicated to agricultural activities at the origin site  57.30%  - 
Social capital     
Main breadwinner died or abandoned household  8.50%  - 
Participation in organizations at the origin site  32.60%  - 
Number of organizations per household at the origin site  0.33  0.03 
Leadership position at the origin site  7.50%  - 
Participation in organizations at the destination site  29.00%  - 
Number of organizations per household at the destination site 0.25  0.02 
Leadership position at the destination site  4.20%  - 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
4.5.1. Asset losses 
 
We estimate regressions in order to first identify the determinants of asset loss. Several 
regressions were estimated to check for the robustness of the results. Table 4 presents 
the results for the OLS, IV and quartile regressions. Given that certain characteristics of 
the department of origin may also determine the nature and extent of asset loss, we 
estimate regressions with and without department
9 controls. Inasmuch as armed groups 
may adopt different displacement tactics depending upon the war strategies they adopt, 
we estimate each regression separately for massive and individual displacement. We 
expect that where the war objective of illegal armed groups is to depopulate territory in 
order to strengthen territorial control, expelling the population en masse (massive 
displacement) is more effective. On the other hand, when asset seizure is the objective, 
the deliberate targeting of particular households (individual displacement) will more 
likely be adopted. The latter case may adjust better to the model  we defined. Lastly, we 
expect that the beneficiaries of income-generating programs should have unobservable 
characteristics closely related to their entrepreneurial abilities, characteristics, which if 
known, might help them design strategies for protecting assets. Consequently, we 
estimate the regressions separately for the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of 
income-generating programs. Since the results are robust for the different specifications, 
we only present the estimations for the complete sample using department controls. 
However, we discuss the different specifications whenever they account for a significant 
change in the results.  
We estimate OLS regressions, and IV regressions in order to instrument for migrating 
within the municipality. The results for the first stage of the instrumental variable 
regression are presented in Table A.1 of the annex, and correspond nicely with an F-
statistic equal to 11.39. Since the process of asset loss appears highly non-linear, we 
estimate quartile regressions.  
                                                 
9 Departments roughly correspond to states in the United States.   
The results reveal conflict dynamics that exert a heavy toll on assets. The fact of 
reactive displacement and the loosing of a male household head are both statistically 
significant; the magnitudes of the coefficients are large, and the results are robust for 
different specifications. Moreover, while it is not significant in the first quartile, the 
coefficient for reactive displacement becomes larger and statistically significant in the 
upper quartiles. The coefficient estimates for reactive displacement decrease when 
additional controls are included, yet this should be expected, inasmuch as violence 
targets particular groups within the population. The direct and traumatic victimization 
represented by reactive displacement and by the loss of the main breadwinner imposes 
asset losses of COP$3.4 million (US$1.574) and $COP6.7 million (US$3101), 
respectively.  
The strategies adopted by households or by government forces to help mitigate asset 
loss are not sufficient to offset the impact of the conflict. Although migrating within the 
municipality and the presence of government forces does reduce asset loss, the 
combined effect of both variables is only COP$5.8 million (US$2685), which does not 
even counteract the loss of the main household breadwinner. In addition, the positive 
impact of migrating within the municipality is not robust for different specification. 
When department controls are included, the size of the coefficient halves; this variable 
then may be capturing some regional effects and not necessarily the effectiveness of 
intramunicipal displacement. Once the variable is instrumentalized, the statistical 
significance disappears. The quartile regressions also show no statistical significance for 
intramunicipal displacement. On the other hand, the effectiveness of government forces 
is robust for different specifications, even if the impact does not offset either reactive 
displacement or the loss of the main breadwinner.  
Formal titles for land plots, rather then reducing asset loss, seems to actually increase its 
extent. The coefficient for formality is not only positive and significant, it also shows 
the largest magnitude (COP$9.8 million (US$4537)). One possible explanation is that 
land plots with formal titles are the largest and thus the most attractive ones. However, 
after controlling for the size of land plots, the size and significance of the coefficients 
are similar. Another interpretation is that when lawlessness is pervasive, formal titles 
are not sufficient for protecting assets. To test for this hypothesis, we interact the 
formality of land titles with the presence of government forces. Again, the size and 
significance of the coefficients are similar. In addition, quartile regressions show that  
the impact of formality with respect to land titles is particularly strong for the median 
quartile, while decreasing for the last one. Land plots with formal titles may be more 
valuable due to the formality of the land titles. The positive effect of land plot size on 
asset loss seems to corroborate this hypothesis.  
The targeting of particular groups within the population in order to achieve war 
objectives also imposes large asset losses, though some variables are not statistically 
significant. First, better educated households face greater asset loss; as indicated by the 
quartile regressions, the effect increases for the highest quartiles. However, the 
coefficient for years of schooling is not robust for different  specifications of the model. 
Second, young household members may be forcefully recruited or may act as 
combatants for opponents groups, and are thus targeted often. These attacks appear to 
increase the extent of asset loss. This effect is particularly strong for persons between 18 
and 65 years of age—having an additional member in this age range increases asset loss 
by COP$1.2 million (US$555). Third, although the coefficient for participation in 
formal organizations is positive, it is not statistically significant. However, when the 
quartile regressions are estimated, participation in organizations implies positive asset 
loss for the median and third quartile, and the impact is not negligible. For example, for 
the median quartile, participation in an additional organization increases asset loss by 
COP$0.75 million (US$347), while the increment in asset loss generated by reactive 
displacement for the same quartile is COP$1.2 million (US$555). Lastly, apparently, 
ethnic minorities do not face greater levels of asset loss. When department controls are 
not included, the extent of asset loss for ethnic minorities is greater, but the effect 
vanishes after including department controls. Regions where ethnic minorities are 
located coincide with regions strategically important to illegal armed groups. Thus, 
ethnic minorities may be attacked simply by virtue of living in strategically valuable 
regions, and not necessarily because they are ethnic minorities.   
Table 4. The Determinants of asset loss
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Reactive displacement  4868.60 
(3.66)*** 












Household head dead or n longer present  6988.40 
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Observations  2320 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 
R-squared  0.0448  0.2067  0.0514 0.217 0.2251  0.2205  0.0403 01383 0.1067 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
Department Controls are included. 
a. Asset losses divided by 1000. 
*Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%.  
***Significant at 1%  
The results presented in Table 4 clearly indicate that conflict-induced shocks impose greater asset 
losses. The impact of the conflict upon asset loss is hardly offset by strategies adopted to prevent 
loss or by the protection provided by government forces.  
4.5.2. Asset accumulation 
In order to understand the process of asset accumulation, we estimate regressions to identify the 
determinants of asset accumulation. Several alternative specifications were estimated in order to 
verify the robustness of the results. First, asset accumulation, besides being determined by 
households’ characteristics, may also depend on regional characteristics as well as the 
municipality size. Among other things, some regions are more prosperous, their labor markets are 
more dynamic, and/or they are more willing to receive displaced population. These factors 
contribute to the displaced population’s asset accumulation process. In addition, the size of the 
urban center may determine how easy or difficult it is to acquire new asset holdings. Although 
large cities may provide more economic opportunities, adapting to a large and anonymous city 
may prove hard for rural households, such as are often found among the displaced population. To 
control for city size, we include controls for Bogotá (the capital city of Colombia), large cities 
with populations between 700.000 and 3.000.000 people, and medium-sized cities with 
populations between 100.000 and 699.000 people. We do not control for small cities with less 
than 100.000 inhabitants. To control for regional heterogeneity, we include department controls. 
Second, we estimate the determinants of asset accumulation separately for length of settlement, 
income generating capacities, and household vulnerability. Lastly, we drop outliers from the time 
of settlement in order to identify whether potential attrition causes an overestimation of poverty 
traps. Dropping outliers does not, however, change the estimation results.  
Instrumental variable regressions and quartile regressions are also estimated. The first stage of 
the instrumental variable regression is presented in Table A.2 of the annex. The first stage fits 
well with an F-statistic ranging from 8.37 and 10.06. Much as with asset loss, asset accumulation 
exhibits several non-linearities, as shown in the graphs discussed in section 3.4. To deal with 
these non-linearities, we estimate quartile regressions.  
The results for all the regressions are presented in Tables 5a and 5b. The results for the 
regressions without the controls for city size are not presented; the coefficient estimates are 
robust for the inclusion of these controls, and the prediction power of the model barely increases. 
As settlement at destination sites progresses, asset accumulation expands. The coefficient and its  
significance are similar for the different specifications estimated. We also include interactions for 
length of settlement and certain household characteristics, such as the fact of having previously 
been dedicated to agricultural activities or having lost the main breadwinner; the coefficients, 
however, are not statistically significant and are thus not reported. However, the contribution of 
length of settlement is not large and even decreases after a while, thus exhibiting the inverted u-
shaped relation or noted earlier. After controlling for all other variables, a displaced household 
needs more than 11 years in order to recover the average asset loss stemming from displacement. 
Furthermore, the effect of length of settlement is weak for households in the first two quartiles of 
the regression, and only picks up for households located at the upper end of the asset distribution. 
These results hold even when the outliers for length of settlement are eliminated.  
Insertion into labor markets and the capacity to generate income positively contribute to asset 
accumulation at destination sites. In particular, insertion in labor markets appears as an effective 
strategy for accumulating assets more effectively; having an unemployed head reduces asset 
accumulation by COP$1.4 millions (US$648). Although the coefficient for unemployment 
somehow decreases when additional controls are included, the size of the coefficient is still large, 
and is significant for the different specifications. The negative impact of unemployment is 
particularly large for households in the upper quartile of the asset distribution.  
Human capital variables play an important role with respect to asset accumulation, yet the sign 
representative of having been previously dedicated to agricultural activities is the opposite of the 
expected one. Better educated households are able to accumulate more assets, yet the effect is not 
large given the overall low education levels of the displaced population. One additional year of 
education for an average displaced household whose head has 5.7 years of schooling increases 
asset accumulation by COP$0.12 million (US$55). The effect of education vanishes, however, 
for quartile regressions, and is only significant for households in the lowest quartile. On the other 
hand, the fact of having been previously dedicated to agriculture contributes positively to asset 
accumulation. This result is opposite our a priori hypothesis, and is robust for all of the different 
specifications. Presumably, after controlling for other characteristics, this variable may be 
capturing some unobservable characteristics, such as the entrepreneurial ability of persons who 
had small agricultural enterprises prior to displacement. Lastly, asset accumulation is higher for 
households with middle-aged heads. The impact of age is higher as we move up the quartiles.  
Assets at origin sites that are still under a household’s control, likewise, social capital, do not 
contribute in any way to asset accumulation. Assets at origin sites are not statistically significant 
and the coefficient is negligible. Despite being able to control a proportion of their assets at the 
point of origin, these assets may not be producing rents, or the rents may not be sufficient to 
expand asset holdings. Social capital—the number of organizations with which household 
members are affiliated at destination sites, likewise, the number of contacts they have—is not 
statistically significant for any of the estimated specifications. Therefore, only human capital 
seems to contribute to asset accumulation at destination sites.  
After controlling for other characteristics, the contribution of income generating programs to 
asset accumulation is large and significant. Asset holdings for beneficiaries of income generating 
programs are COP$2.2 millions (US$1018) larger. The coefficient for beneficiaries of income 
generating programs, however, is not robust. When additional controls are included, the 
coefficient decreases significantly. This result is expected, as being the beneficiary of income 
generating programs is related to household characteristics. Despite these positive results, the 
coefficient for participation in income generating programs loses significance after 
instrumentalizing for it.  
Vulnerable households are less able to recover from asset loss. Male headed households fare 
better during the recovery process, and as we move up the quartiles, the significance of a 
household being male-headed with respect to asset recovery increases. The estimations that 
include only vulnerability variables show a large and significant positive effect for having a male 
household head. However, once other controls are incorporated into the estimation, the size of the 
coefficient reduces. Presumably, female headed households exhibit particular vulnerable 
characteristics that reduce asset accumulation. After controlling for these characteristics, the 
impact of being a male headed household decreases (COP$1 million – US$462). On the other 
hand, asset accumulation does indeed seem difficult for ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities face 
poor conditions at destination sites because their connections with their cultural heritage and 
social networks have been broken; some groups have difficulties speaking in Spanish, and thus 
have less access to government programs. Thus, the asset holdings of ethnic minorities are 
COP$2.0 million (US$925) lower. This result is robust for different specification and persists 
even after controlling for other characteristics.  
  

















Length of settlement – days  5.9849 
(13.52)*** 
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Department  controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations  2332 2331 2319 2318 2321 2320 2319 2318 
R-squared  0.1052 0.1851 0.0536 0.1612 0.0256 0.1337 0.1343 0.2067 
Controls for municipality size are included (country capital, large city, and medium size city). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
Table 5b. The determinants of asset accumulation 
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Department  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2319 2318 2318 2318 2318 
R-squared  0.094 0.1058 0.007 0.0824  0.2429 
Controls for municipality size are included (country capital, large city, and medium-sized city). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.  
The displacement shock is certainly large. Conflict and forced migration brings about a 
depletion of physical, financial, human, and social capital. The erosion of a household’s 
asset base, coupled with restricted access to labor markets, pushes a displaced 
household into an extremely vulnerable situation and hinders asset accumulation, thus, 
imposing high long-term costs which are not easily overcome. Notably, these 
consequences persist through time. Indeed, only a small group of households appear to 
have initiated a moderate accumulation of assets under such conditions. The extent of 
asset accumulation for displaced households is strongly related to the conditions 
required for successful productive activities—a longer period of settlement at 
destination sites, access to credits, to employment, and a less vulnerable household 
structure. However, since the asset loss due to displacement is substantial, households 
will not be able to engage in virtuous cycles of asset accumulation unless they are 
supported by special social and government programs. However, the efforts still seem 
insufficient. For example, asset loss for a household that reactively displaced and 
suffered the death of its main breadwinner is COP$10.2 million (US$4722) higher than 
for other households. On the other hand, none of the variables determining asset 
accumulation at destination sites is able to offset this effect.  
5. Conclusions 
A conflict-induced shock imposes heavy asset losses upon a group of victims, in this 
case, a displaced population. The nature of conflict-related events leading to forced 
displacement and the resulting consequences strongly determines the magnitude of asset 
loss. Better-off households with larger asset holdings or which are strongly embedded in 
social networks pose attractive targets for illegal armed groups. Because their asset 
holdings prior to displacement are large and the consequences of the attacks are 
correspondingly extremely costly, such households suffer substantial asset loss. On the 
other hand, households with a less traumatic victimization profile or which migrate 
preventively in anticipation that the conflict will escalate tend to face less severe asset 
loss, and are thus better able to cope with displacement shock.  
Regardless of the extent of asset loss caused by forced migration, all displaced 
households are left with an asset base seemingly insufficient for escaping poverty. 
Displaced persons cannot be assimilated in the same way that traditional migrants are. 
Our results show that displaced households do not catch up even after consolidating  
settlement at destination sites. Unless a positive intervention is undertaken, displaced 
households become locked into a low-level economic trajectory; once that happens, 
leaping forward into a high-return asset level becomes highly unlikely. In this respect, 
forced displacement has generated a poverty trap for certain segments of the Colombian 
population. Targeted assistance, such as asset transfers and protections against shocks, 
is needed to stimulate growth.  
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Annex: First stage regressions for instrumental variable regressions  
 
Table A.1. First stage: intramunicipal displacement 
Variables Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Reactive displacement  0.0231 
(1.15) 
Household head dead or not present  -0.0731 
(-2.96)*** 












Formal land title  0.0442 
(2.09)** 




Total hectares of land  -0.0003 
(-2.05)* 
Years of schooling of the household head  -0.0026 
(-0.78) 
Number of persons between 12 and 17 
years of age 
0.0085 
(1.21) 
Number of persons between 17 and 65 
years of age 
0.0042 
(0.80) 
Ethnic minority  0.0405 
(2.12)** 
Contacts at destination site  0.0636 
(4.18)*** 
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Department controls  No  Yes 
Observations 2319  2318 
F-statistic 10,06  8.37 
Controls for urbanization structure are included. These include country capital, large city, medium-sized 
city and small city. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%. 
 